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of burdens imposed by particular legislation, setting aside concern
for the public interest deemed to be at stake.2 Since, as the Court
in Allied recognized, it is not impairment of contractual obligation
which is of constitutional concern but rather substantial impairment, the notion of a fairness standard is an inherent feature of
contract clause analysis even under present case law. Should the
Supreme Court follow this perspective in a situation similar to
Allied, a like result might appear to be less of an aberration.
With the Allied decision following so soon after United States
Trust, the contract clause has certainly been revived. A careful
evaluation of the decisions indicate, however, that the clause has
merely been resuscitated rather than revised. Aside from the development of the dual standard of review in United States Trust and
the affirmation of enlargement of obligation as impairment announced in Allied, the Court has retained the traditional analysis
of the 1930's. Whether the Court will attempt to unravel the effect
of state legislation upon the "multitudinous private arrangements"
of society" can be but speculation. There is a growing sense, however, that the Court may be increasingly willing to move beyond
mere resuscitation, to revitalize and reinterpret contractual obligations in the modern setting.
JEAN

F. REED

First Amendment Interest Balancing-Behind
Bars?
This casenote examines the recent decision of Houchins v.
KQED; Inc., in which the Supreme Court of the United States
narrowly construed the right of access afforded the news media
in their coverage of penal facilities. The analysisfocuses upon the
first amendment methodology utilized by the Court in its decisionmaking process. The author concludes with a critical assessment of the Court's departure from accurate interest balancing
techinque.
Following the suicide of a prisoner in the Alameda County Jail
at Santa Rita, California, KQED, a licensed operator of both a radio
72. It has been suggested that a "takings" approach would have better justified the
holding of the Court in United States Trust. See The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV.
L. Rzv. 1, 90-94 (1977) (fairness-centered takings standard as a measure of clear governmentgenerated costs would be an effective response to the Court's concern for misuse of the police
power).
73. Justice Frankfurter used this phrase in East N.Y. Say. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230,
232 (1945).
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and television station, sought access to the facility. The county
sheriff refused to permit station news personnel to enter. Subsequently, .the station filed suit seeking preliminary and permanent
injunctions to prevent the county sheriff from "'excluding KQED
news personnel from the Greystone cells and Santa Rita facilities
and generally preventing full and accurate news coverage of the
condition prevailing therein.' " Basing its claims on the first and
fourteenth amendments, KQED contended that the limited access
policies of the prison effectively precluded the gathering of news, a
right essential to the protection of freedom of speech and of the
press.' The sheriff thereafter provided public tours which afforded
limited access to the jail. The United States District Court for the
Northern District of California, however, granted a preliminary injunction preventing the exclusion of KQED news personnel and
equipment "'at reasonable time and hours'" for the purpose of
interviewing inmates and obtaining full coverage of prison conditions.3 On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit sustained the district court's order, concluding
that the public and the media have a first and fourteenth amendment right of access to prisons and jails.4 On certiorari, the Supreme
Court of the United States held, reversed: In the absence of legislation so providing, the media has no constitutionally mandated right
of access to penal facilities beyond that of the general public.
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 98 S.Ct. 2588 (1978).1
Over the years, the Supreme Court has developed a number of
1. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 98 S.Ct. 2588, 2591 (1978) (quoting KQED's complaint).
The NAACP joined in this suit, alleging a
'special concern with conditions at Santa Rita because the prisoner population
at the jail is disproportionately black, and the members of the NAACP depend
on the news media for information about conditions in the jail so that they can
meaningfully participate in the current public debate on jail conditions in Alameda County.'
Id. at 2600 n.5 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting the NAACP's complaint). Since special
relief was neither sought nor granted, the claims of the NAACP were not considered separately in the opinion.
2. Id. at 2593.
3. Id. (quoting the district court's preliminary injunction order).
4. KQED, Inc. v. Houchins, 546 F.2d 284 (9th Cir. 1976).
5. Chief Justice Burger delivered the plurality opinion of the Court, in which he was
joined by Justices White and Rehnquist. In a concurring opinion, Justice Stewart accepted
the plurality's recognition of a constitutional right of equal access afforded the public and
the press; he diverged from the plurality, however, in his characterization of the right of equal
access as one necessarily based on practical distinctions between the public and the news
media. Dissenting Justices Stevens, Brennan and Powell objected to the failure of the Court
to grant relief commensurate with the special needs of the press. Justices Marshall and
Blackmun did not participate in the decision. 98 S.Ct. at 2588.
This note will focus on the first amendment methodological aspects of the case, and
therefore will only indirectly examine the specific first amendment issues raised.
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doctrinal approaches for analyzing first amendment claims. Among
these methodologies are the "bad tendency" test,' the "clear and
present danger" standard,' the "absolute" test8 and the implementation of "ad hoc" interest balancing.' The latter, introduced in
Schneider v. State,"° is traditionally employed in cases where the
challenged restraint is not directly imposed, but rather is unavoidably ancillary to a regulation designed to further legitimate societal
goals." Thus,
a governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within
the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest."
The broad language of the first amendment, devoid as it is of
interpretive guidelines, is vulnerable to such discretionary limita6. This method, utilized in the earlier stages of first amendment interpretation, validated legislative regulation of expression that was thought to endanger the public peace and
safety. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652
(1925).
7. "The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47, 62 (1919) (Holmes, J.); see Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927). The "clear
and present danger" standard was abandoned in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951),
in favor of a "balancing" test.
8. The absolutist determines whether speech is within the "magic circle" of first amendment protection by means of definitional categorization. Thus, while "no law" which
"abridges" the "freedom of speech" is constitutionally permissible, invalidation of a regulation may depend upon the definition accorded each of these concepts in a particular case.
See, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 780, 788-91 (1961) (Black,
J., dissenting) (definition of "law"); Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd.,
367 U.S. 1, 137-38, 147-69 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (definition of "abridge"); Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 579-81 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting) (definition of "the freedom
of speech").
9. Historically, the interest balancing technique has been employed in casesdealing with
state infringement upon interstate commerce. See, e.g, Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S.
137 (1970); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); South Carolina State Highway
Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.)
299 (1851). More recently, it has appeared in the "new" equal protection cases. See Gunther,
The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward:In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAnv. L. Rav. 1 (1972).
10. 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
11. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961) (Harlan, J.); Talley v. California,
362 U.S. 60 (1960) (Clark, J., dissenting); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959)
(Harlan, J.); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (Harlan, J.); Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds,
339 U.S. 382 (1950) (Vinson, C.J.).
12. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
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tions.13 As originally developed, however, the balancing method had
some presumptive safeguards against undue restraint of speech.
The first amendment was accorded a "preferred position,"" and any
legislation appearing to infringe upon it was strictly scrutinized.
Regulations involving "prior restraints," i.e., where the government
practiced prepublication censorship, bore "a heavy presumption
against . . . constitutional validity,"'

5

and restrictions that were

7

vague'" or overbroad in scope were struck down as lacking requisite
explicit standards. Furthermore, if the legitimate governmental interest asserted could be achieved by means of a "less restrictive
alternative,"' 8 or if existing alternative channels of expression were
unsatisfactory substitutes,'" the abridging legislation fell.
Despite auspiciously protective beginnings, the "ad hoc" inter13. For the competing view that the first amendment is an absolute mandate, reflecting
a prior balancing by the Framers, see Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 865 (1960);
Meiklejohn, The Balancingof Self-PreservationAgainst PoliticalFreedom, 49 CAn. L. Rv.
4 (1961).
14. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 (1949); Saia v. New York City, 334 U.S. 558,
562 (1948); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946); Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321
U.S. 573, 575 (1944); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943).
15. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963); see Nebraska Press Ass'n v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 556-59 (1976); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714
(1971) (per curiam) (Pentagon Papers case); Organization for a Better Austin v. O'Keefe, 402
U.S. 415, 419 (1971). For elaboration of those "exceptional cases" where*prior restraints are
constitutionally permissible, see Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
16. See, e.g., Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939) (voiding statute making
membership in a "gang" criminal), cited in L. T=ma,
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(1978).
17."A law is void on its face if it 'does not aim specifically at evils within the allowable
area of [government] control, but . . . sweeps within its ambit other activities that constitute an exercise' of protected expressive or associational rights." L. TRmIB,
supra note 16, at
710 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940)); see, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416
U.S. 134, 231 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969).
18. E.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 268 (1967) (federal law preventing any
Communist Party member from working in defense facilities); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479, 488 (1960) (Arkansas statute requiring teachers in state-supported schools to file annual
list of organizational affiliations); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939) (anti-handbill
ordinances for purpose of minimizing litter, noise, traffic congestion and invasion of privacy).
See generally, Wormuth & Meikin, The Doctrine of the Reasonable Alternative, 9 UTAH L.
Rav. 254, 267-93 (1964); Note, Less Drastic Means and the FirstAmendment, 78 YM L.J.
464 (1969).
19. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 757 n.15 (1976); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 & n.4 (1974); cf. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 267 (1967)
(rejecting argument that reasonably effective alternatives did not exist); Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963) (same). See also Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408-09 (1974);
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972). Conversely, where equally effective
alternatives are readily available, the restriction is not deemed significant. See Greer v.
Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 839 (1976); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827, 830 (1974); Saxbe v.
Wahington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 846-47 (1974); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 56667 & n.12 (1972).
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est balancing approach was offset by development of the "judicial
restraint" doctrine," which acceded the function of balancing competing interests to the legislature. Thus, the judicial scales, which
had previously favored the first amendment mandate against governmental infringement, began to tip heavily on the side of legislative regulations.2 '
It is precisely this shift which libertarian absolutists have so
strongly criticized.22 Clearly, the effectiveness of the balancing technique depends upon a careful case-by-case analysis of the relevant
facts.23 In contrast, the "categorization" technique classifies certain
protected areas of speech and creates cognizable precedent which is
later dispositive of any case fitting within the predetermined categories."4 As applied, these two techniques are not mutually exclusive;
indeed, the responsible determination of whether a case fits a previously defined mold for constitutional purposes requires careful
examination of the particular facts."5
The recently decided prison access cases provide an illustration
20. "It is not our function to examine the validity of. . .congressional judgment ...
We are concerned solely with determining whether the statute before us has exceeded the
bounds imposed by the Constitution when First Amendment rights are at stake." United
States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 267 (1967).
21. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 539-40 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring):
Free-speech cases are not an exception to the principle that we are not legislators,
that direct policy-making is not our province. How best to reconcile competing
interests is the business of legislatures, and the balance they strike is a judgment
not to be displaced by ours, but to be respected unless outside the pale of fair
judgment.
See also Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the FirstAmendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 877
(1963): "The 'balancing' test has tended to reduce the first amendment, especially when
a legislative judgment is weighed in the balance, to a limp and lifeless formality."
22. A libertarian absolutist is an ideologue who believes that the courts should have
plenary powers of review to prevent Congress from abriding first amendment freedoms
through "ad hoc" political balancing. See, e.g., Frantz, The FirstAmendment in the Balance,
71 YALs L.J. 1424, 1447 (1962) [hereinafter cited as First Amendment Balance]. See
generally Frantz, Is the First Amendment Law?-A Reply to Professor Mendelson, 51 CAuF.
L. REv. 729 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Frantz Reply]; Meiklejohn, What Does the First
Amendment Mean? 20 U. Cm. L. Rzv. 461 (1953); Meiklejohn, supra, note 13.
23. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959) (emphasis added):
"Where First Amendment rights are asserted to bar governmental interrogation resolution of
the issue always involves a balancing by the courts of the competing private and public
interests at stake in the particularcircumstances shown."
24. See L. TRm, supra note 16, at 584; FirstAmendment Balance, supra note 22 at 1435,
1442; cf. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(categorization technique "too inflexible for the non-Euclidean problems to be solved.")
25. See Note, The Speech and Press Clause of the First Amendment as Ordinary
Language, 87 HAiv. L. Rzv. 374, 381 (1973): "[The definers must. . . resort to balancing
in applying their theoretical distinctions to actual cases."
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of this proposition." In Pell v. Procunier,2"the Supreme Court considered the issue of whether a regulation2 prohibiting interviews
with specific individual prisoners infringed upon the first and fourteenth amendment rights of the plaintiff inmates and upon the first
amendment rights of the plaintiff press. The restrictive regulation
reflected legitimate penological concerns~' and did not foreclose alternative opportunities for interaction between the press and prison
inmates. 0 Finding no infringement, the Court was careful to analyze
all factual aspects, as well as conflicting interests, asserted by the
opposing parties. The language of the opinion is replete with balancing terminology. In setting forth the test to be followed, the Court
stated:
In the First Amendment context . . . a prison inmate retains

those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his
status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives
of the corrections system. Thus, challenges to prison restrictions
that are asserted to inhibit First Amendment interests must be
analyzed in terms of the legitimate policies and goals of the
corrections system, to whose custody and care the prisoner has
been committed in accordance with due process of law."
Refuting the asserted right of the plaintiff press to "interview
any inmate who is willing to speak with them, in the, absence of an
individualized determination that the particular interview might
create a clear and present danger to prison security or to some other
substantial interest served by the corrections system, 32 the Court
relied upon Branzburg v. Hayes33 and Zemel v. Rusk,3 which estab26. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817
(1974).
27. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
28. Section 415.071 of the California Department of Corrections Manual provided that
"[piress and other media interviews with specific individual inmates will not be permitted."
Quoted in 417 U.S. at 819.
29. 417 U.S. at 822-23. Among these concerns were deterrence from further crime, rehabilitation and internal prison security.
30. Id. at 824-25. The prisoners could communicate by mail, receive limited visits from
family, friends, clergy, attorneys or former acquaintances, and talk with any press members
who visited the jail.
31. Id. at 822.
32. Id. at 829. The very language of the claim, as phrased by the Court, acknowleged
that it was asserted within an interest balancing context. As the Court stated earlier: "In a
number of contexts, we have held 'that reasonable "time, place and manner" regulations (of
communicative activity] may be necessary to further significant governmental interests, and
are permitted.'" Id. at 826. See also note 48 infra.
33. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). In Branzburg, the Court determined that even a qualified journalist was not privileged to withhold source identity from a good faith grand jury inquiry.
34. 381 U.S. 1 (1965). In Zemel, the Court upheld the Secretary of State's refusal to
validate American passports for travel to Cuba, trivializing plaintiff's contention that such
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lished that "[tihe Constitution does not . . . require government
to accord the presss' special access to information not shared by
members of the public generally.""8
Immediately following the Pell decision was Saxbe v. Washington Post Co. 7 In Saxbe, the Court faced a situation similar to that
in Pell: respondents, a major metropolitan newspaper and one of its
reporters, initiated litigation to challenge the constitutionality of a
federal regulation" prohibiting any personal interviews between
newsmen and specific federal prison inmates. The Pell case afforded
an apt model for decision by analogy. In Saxbe, categorization came
to the fore; yet a reasonable analysis of the facts preceded the determination that such a method was appropriate. Thus, the statement
that "[tihe policies of the Federal Bureau of Prisons regarding
visitations to prison inmates do not differ significantly from the
restraint infringed upon his first amendment right to be informed (a necessary adjunct to the
exercise of freedom of speech). The Court stated that the "right to speak and publish does
not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information." Id. at 17.
35. In KQED, the plaintiff press challenged the regulation as an infringement upon the
protection afforded by the "press" clause, rather than the "speech" clause. For a discussion
of whether a meaningful distinction exists between the two, see, e.g. Lange, The Speech and
Press Clauses, 23 U.C.L.A. L. Rzv. 77 (1975); Nimmer, Introduction-IsFreedom of the Press
a Redundancy: What Does it Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HAsTmGs L.J. 639 (1975);
Stewart, "Or of the Press," 25 HAfSrNos L.J. 631 (1975). While Justice Stewart's concurring
opinion in KQED focused upon the special role of the press in informing the electorate, the
plurality opinion of the Court failed to differentiate clearly between the speech and press
clauses in resolving the right to access issue. 98 S.Ct. at 2588.
36. Pell, 417 U.S. at 834. While recognizing the importance of an "informed public," the
Supreme Court has repeatedly maintained that the first amendment does not affirmatively
mandate either access to, or disclosure of, information within the government's control. This
is particularly true in cases where it is alleged that national security is involved. See, e.g.,
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (validating executive privilege); Alderman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (dictum discussing the right to withhold military secrets
from diclosure); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) (denying asserted right to travel to Cuba
based on freedom of speech clause); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964)
(rejecting first amendment argument that member of communist organization has right to
travel outside the United States as means of acquiring knowledge necessary for self.
government); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) (same as Aptheker); United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) ("secrecy in respect to information
gathered . . . may be highly necessary, and the premature disclosure of it productive of
harmful results"). But see New York Times Co., v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)
(upholding newspaper publication of the Pentagon Papers, in the face of asserted national
security interests).
37. 417 U.S. 843 (1974). The Pell and Saxbe decisions were rendered on the same day.
38. Paragraph 4b(6) of Policy Statement 1220.1A of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, which
provided:
Press representatives will not be permitted to interview individual inmates.
This rule will apply even where the inmate requests or seeks an interview. However, conversation may be permitted with inmates whose identity is not to be
made public, if it is limited to the discussion of institutional facilities, programs
and activities.
Quoted in 417 U.S. at 844.
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California policies considered in Pell v. Procunier"3 ' was substantiated by a detailed assessment of the visitation policies at the pertinent prison facilities.10 It was only after this examination that the
Court concluded: "We find this case constitutionally indistinguishable from Pell v. Procunier.

.

. and thus fully controlled by

the holding in that case.""
The Pell and Saxbe prison access decisions might be characterized as reflecting a responsible interest balancing,"'" followed by a
responsible categorization. As the most recent decision of this genre,
however, KQED is disturbing in that neither of these traditional
doctrinal methods is legitimately or openly employed.
In KQED, the Court derived its holding that the media has no
constitutionally mandated right of access to penal facilities beyond
that of the general public from the Pell and Saxbe decisions. The
Court arrived at this determination first, by undermining KQED's
use of case law; 3 second, by relying upon the Pell and Saxbe holdings; and third, by buttressing its stance with an artillery of arguments normally employed in interest balancing. The Court paraded
separation of powers, lack of judicially manageable standards, compelling government interest and existence of viable alternatives in
support of its decision." Yet, it refused to apply the "proper test, ' ",
as articulated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit: "[A] governmental restriction on First Amendment rights
can be upheld only if the restriction furthers an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to suppressing speech and
the restriction is the least drastic means of furthering that governmental interest."" Indeed, the Court openly rejected "ad hoc" interest balancing on the grounds that "the Constitution affords no
39. 417 U.S. at 846.
40. Id. at 846-50. The Court determined that "members of the press [were] accorded

substantial access to the federal prisons in order to observe and report the conditions they
[found] there. Indeed, journalists [were] given access to the prisons and to prison inmates
that in significant respects exceed[ed] that afforded to members of the general public." Id.
at 849. Press personnel were permitted to tour the prisons, to conduct brief interviews with
any inmates they might encounter and to photograph the prison facilities. Id.
41. Id. at 850.

42. For a discussion advocating this technique, see Gunther, supra note 9.
43. 98 S.Ct. at 2594-95. KQED relied upon favorable language in Pell v. Procunier, 417
U.S. 817 (1974) (dicta); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966); Grosjean v. American Press
Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); and Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1922), to support its proposi-

tion that the media should have a special right of prison access. Unfortunately, none of these
cases directly supported that contention. Indeed, contrary language in these decisions negated assertion of the right of prison access, and the fact patterns were distinguishable. 98 S.
Ct. at 2595.
44. 98 S. Ct. at 2596-97.

45. 546 F.2d 284, 286 (9th Cir. 1976).
46. Id. (emphasis added).
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guidelines" and, "absent statutory standards, hundreds of judges
would . . . be at large to fashion ad hoc standards, in individual

cases, according to their own ideas of what seems 'desirable' or
'expedient.' ",,

One might ask, however, when, in all the years of judicial interest balancing, has the first amendment ever provided guidelines?
Nevertheless, the Court has not been deterred from utilizing an
interest balancing methodology in the past to invalidate legislation
whose guidelines were overbroad or vague. Clearly, in those instances, "no guidelines" were perceived as preferable to constitutionally
unacceptable ones.
This is particularly true where, as in KQED, implementation
of the restrictive regulation is left to the discretion of an administrative officer. 8 By disclaiming its role as an interest balancer, the
governmental Court has ceded its power to check governmental infringement upon first amendment liberties not to the legislature,
but to an individual civil servant. Surely, this was not what Madison envisioned when he said:
If they are incorporated into the Constitution, independent
tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner
the guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the Legislative or
Executive; they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment
upon rights expressly stipulated for in the Constitution by the
declaration of rights."
While it is apparent that interest balancing is being employed at
some level in the KQED opinion, on its face, the decision seems to
reflect a classification technique. This is especially evident in the
precise formulation of the issue: "The right to receive ideas and
information is not the issue in this case. . .

The issue is a claim

[sic] special privilege of access which the court rejected in Pell and
Saxbe, a right which is not essential to guarantee the freedom to
communicate or publish."5
47. 98 S.Ct. 2588, 2597 (1978).
48. See Frantz Reply, supra note 22.
It is . . .obvious, I think, that mere regulations of the time, place, and manner

of speech . . . do not, per se, affect the "freedom" of speech. They may do so,
however, if they are applied in a discriminatory manner so as to burden one point
of view more then another, or if they are left open to discretionaryapplicationby
officials who are empowered to use them as an instrument for regulating the
content of public discourse, or if they are carried to such an extent that adequate

low-cost means of reaching the public with all points of view are no longer available.
Id. at 736 (emphasis added).
49. 1 ANNALS OF CONoaESS 457 (1789), quoted in Frantz Reply, supra note 22, at 738.
50. 98 S. Ct. at 2596 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). One might criticize this
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As stated at the outset of the plurality opinion, "[t]he question presented is whether the news media have a constitutional right
5
of access to a county jail, over and above that of other persons."'
The answer is simply that "[u]nder [the] holdings in Pell v.
Procunier. . .and Saxbe v. Washington Post, . . . until the political branches decree otherwise, as they are free to do, the media has
no right, special of [sic] access to the Alameda County Jail different from or greater than that afforded the public generally." 52
The KQED holding appears to be an innocuous restatement of
principles decided in Pell and Saxbe; its corollary that "neither the
First Amendment nor Fourteenth Amendment mandates a right of
access to governmental information or sources of information within
the government's control" 3 is not a novel proposition. The KQED
holding, however, is disturbing because, as pointed out by Justice
Stevens in his dissenting opinion, the Court, through its formulation
of the issue to be resolved, has summarily dismissed the "access to
public jails" issue as a mere backdrop of the "public versus press
right to access" distinction, which the holdings in Saxbe and Pell
are seen to control. While Saxbe was legitimately categorized as
"constitutionally indistinguishable" from Pell, the same may not
fairly be said of KQED. The categorization and balancing language
of this opinion is a mere subterfuge as the Court has failed to focus
sufficiently on the underlying facts-a step indispensable to either
method. Had it done so, the Court might have concluded that the
"legal issue" to be decided was more accurately stated by Justice
Rehnquist, who was acting Circuit Justice for the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit:
If the "no greater access" doctrine of Pell and Saxbe applies to
this case, the Court of Appeals and the District Court were wrong,
and the injunction was an abuse of discretion. If, on the other
hand, the holding in Pell is to be viewed as impliedly limited to
the situation where there already existed substantial press and
public access to the prison, then Pell and Saxbe are not necessarily dispositive, and review by this Court of the propriety of the
injunction, in light of those cases would be appropriate, although
not necessary."4
framing of the issue, in light of Professor Fried's admonition: "One thing is perfectly clear,
that under no circumstances should the Court formulate the conflict in a particular case, or
identify the elements of the balance to be struck, in such a way that the statement itself
prejudices the decision." Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections on the Supreme
Court's Balancing Test, 76 HAv.L. Rav. 755, 763 (1963).
51. 98 S. Ct. at 2591 (emphasis added).
52. Id. at 2597.
53. Id.; see note 36 supra.
54. 98 S. Ct. at 2602. (quoting Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 429 U.S. 1341, 1344 (Rehnquist,
Circuit Justice, 1977)).
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Unlike the Pell and Saxbe situtations, the relevant visitation
policies in KQED were unduly restrictive and not clearly justified
by legitimate penological goals." While in the former cases, libertarian first amendment concerns" were sufficiently met by meaningful alternatives, viable alternative channels of communication
were inadequate in the instant case. 7
In keeping with methodological doctrine, the Court in KQED,
as was done in Saxbe, could have conceivably determined that the
distinction in prison visitation policies between the case at bar and
the Pell and Saxbe cases was constitutionally insignificant; therefore, the latter cases were controlling. Alternatively, the Court could
have found KQED distinguishable. But through "ad hoc" interest
balancing, as was done in Pell, it could have ultimately arrived at
the same conclusion. Instead, even though a form of interest balancing supplied the underpinnings of the KQED decision, through irresponsible categorization, the Court, sub silentio, validated stringent
public prison access policies under the guise of stare decisis. 8
Thomas Lord Erskine, speaking in defense of Thomas Paine's
work, The Rights of Man, observed:
Let us consider, my Lords, that arbitrary power has seldom
or never been introduced into any country at once. It must be
introduced by slow degrees, and as it were step by step, lest the
people should see its approach. The barriers and fences of the
people's liberty must be plucked up one by one, and some plausi55. Id. at 2600, nn.3 & 4, 2601 & nn.7-11, 2603 & n.14, 2604-05 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
56. These concerns were noted by the Court. Id. at 2593-94, 2598, 2605 & n.20. The basic

tenet was eloquently expressed by James Madison:
A popular government, without popular information or a means of acquiring
it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy; or perhaps both. Knowledge will
forever govern ignorance. And a people who mean to be their own governors, must
arm themselves with the power knowledge gives.
Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), reprinted in 9 WRmNGS OF JAMES
MADiSoN 103 (G. Hurst ed. 1910), quoted in Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to
Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 1. This ideal has alternatively been expressed by both "the free
flow of information" and "the marketplace of ideas" metaphors. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969);
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616
(1919) (Holmes J., dissenting).
57. "I cannot agree with petitioners that the inmates' visitation and telephone privileges
were reasonable alternative means of informing the public at large about conditions within
Santa Rita." 98 S. Ct. at 2603 n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See note .55 and accompanying
text supra. For the view that such communicative channels as existed in KQED, id. at 2596,
are inadequate to effectively inform the public, see Parks, The Open Government Principle:
Applying the Right to Know Under the Constitution, 26 Gzo. WASH. L. Rxv. 1, 2-3 (1957).
58. See Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on Principle
and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. Rzv. 1, 5-9 (1964) (criticizing
"legitimation" as being contrary to "principled constitutional adjudication").
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ble pretenses must be found for removing or hoodwinking, one
after another, those sentries who are posted by the constitution
of a free country for warning the people of their danger. 9
In KQED, the Court is a constitutional sentry fallen asleep. It
has failed to protect meaningful access to publically supported penological facilities and, presumably, to "all other public facilities
such as hospitals and mental institutions."' 0
TERESA L. MussETTo

The Privileges and Immunities Clause: A
Reaffirmation of Fundamental Rights
In this note, the author examines the continuing debate over
the role of the judiciary in reviewing state legislative acts and
indicates the continued reluctance of the Supreme Court of the
United States to expand the content of rightsprotected under the
privileges and immunities clause of articleIV and the fourteenth
amendment. The authorconcludes that the present refusal of the
Court to impose its own value judgments over those of the state
legislature is consistent with the purpose and past interpretation
of the privileges and immunities clause, absent a conflict with
other rights of the Constitution.
A Montana resident, who was licensed by the state as a hunting
guide, and four nonresident hunters sued the Fish and Game Commission of Montana in federal district court' seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief from a discriminatory licensing scheme. Under
this scheme, nonresidents were charged between seven and one-half
to twenty-five times more than residents for elk hunting privileges.'
A three-judge district court, in a two to one decision, held that the
licensing scheme as applied to nonresidents did not violate the Constitution on the grounds that the asserted right was not one that was
59. E. WALFORD, SPEECHES OF THOMAS LORD ERSKINE 336 (1870), quoted in FirstAmend-

ment Balance, supra note 22, at 1424.
60. 98 S. Ct. at 2597.
1. Montana Outfitters Action Group v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 417 F. Supp. 1005 (D.
Mont. 1976).
2. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 26-202.1(4), (12), 26-230 (Supp. 1977) provide that a
Montana resident can purchase a license solely for elk for $9, while a nonresident must
purchase a license which entitles him to take one elk, one deer, one black bear, and game
birds, and to fish with hook and line for a fee of $225. Under these statutes, a resident can
enjoy all of the privileges granted to the nonresident under the combination license for only

$30.

